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ABSTRACT 
We present a theory and neurocomputational model of how specific brain operations produce 
complex decision and preference phenomena, including those explored in prospect theory and 
decision affect theory. We propose that valuation and decision making are emotional processes, 
involving interacting brain areas that include two expectation-discrepancy subsystems: a 
dopamine-encoded system for positive events and a serotonin-encoded system for negative ones. 
The model provides a rigorous account of loss aversion and the shape of the value function from 
prospect theory. It also suggests multiple distinct neurological mechanisms by which information 
framing may affect choices, including ones involving anticipated pleasure. It further offers a 
neural basis for the interactions among affect, prior expectations and counterfactual comparisons 
explored in decision affect theory. Along with predicting the effects of particular brain 
disturbances and damage, the model suggests specific neurological explanations for individual 
differences observed in choice and valuation behaviors. 
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How do people decide what clothes to wear, what to eat for dinner, what car to buy, or 
what kind of career to pursue? In traditional economics, the standard answer is that people decide 
by maximizing expected utility, but psychologists have found many problems with this kind of 
decision theory as a description of human behavior (e.g., Camerer, 2000; Kahneman & Tversky, 
2000; Koehler, Brenner, & Tversky, 1997; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1991). Economists commonly take preferences as given, but from a psychological point of view 
it should be possible to explain how preferences arise from cognitive and affective processes. 
Work in this spirit has made tremendous progress in revealing key features and dynamics missed 
by theories disconnected from the study of cognitive, emotional and socially motivated 
phenomena, such as a common hypersensitivity to losses over equivalent gains (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) and the affective influence of prior expectations and counterfactual comparisons 
on preference judgments (Mellers, 2000). Moreover, with the rise of cognitive and affective 
neuroscience, it should be possible to identify precise neural mechanisms underlying these 
behavioral-level explanations of why people make the choices that they do. 
We propose neural affective decision theory as a psychologically and neurologically 
realistic account of specific brain mechanisms underlying human preference and decision. The 
theory consists of four principles, which we shall list here and describe in detail later: 
1. Affect. Decision making is a cognitive-affective process, crucially dependent on emotional 
evaluation of potential actions. 
2. Brain. Decision making is a neural process driven by coordinated dynamic interactions among 
multiple brain areas, including parts of prefrontal cortex as well as major subcortical systems. 
3. Valuation. The brain forms preferences via interacting but distinct mechanisms for positive 
and negative outcomes, encoded primarily by dopamine and serotonin, respectively.   3 
4. Framing. Judgments and decisions vary depending on how the context and manner of the 
presentation of information initiate different neural activation patterns. 
There is substantial empirical evidence for each of these principles, and when integrated in the 
precise manner we outline they can explain the findings of a wide range of psychological and 
neurological phenomena. 
In order to connect these principles with experimental results in a mathematically and 
neurologically rigorous fashion, we have developed a neurocomputational model called 
ANDREA (Affective Neuroscience of Decision through Reward-based Evaluation of 
Alternatives). It operates within the Neural Engineering Framework (NEF) developed by 
Eliasmith and Anderson (2003), using biologically realistic populations of neurons to encode and 
transform complex representations of relevant information. ANDREA simulates computations 
among several thousand neurons to model coordinated activities in seven major brain areas that 
contribute to valuation and decision making: the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, anterior 
cingulate cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the ventral striatum, midbrain dopaminergic 
neurons, and serotonergic neurons centered in the dorsal raphe nucleus of the brainstem. 
ANDREA successfully produces detailed neural-level simulations of behavioral findings 
explored in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and the decision affect theory of 
Mellers and colleagues (1997). It shows how specific neural processes can produce behaviors 
observed in both psychological experiments and real-world scenarios that have provided 
compelling evidence for these preference and choice theories. In particular, ANDREA provides 
neurological explanations for the major hypothesis of prospect theory that losses have greater 
psychological force than gains, as well as for the fundamental claim of decision affect theory that 
the evaluation (and subsequent potential choice) of an option is strongly influenced by its   4 
perceived relative pleasure, an emotional determinant that is dependant on expectations and 
counterfactual comparisons. In our concluding discussion, we compare ANDREA to other 
models in decision neuroscience, describe promising avenues of expansion for ANDREA and 
neural affective decision theory, and suggest additional psychological phenomena that are likely 
to fall within the scope of our theory. 
NEURAL AFFECTIVE DECISION THEORY 
We now examine in detail the four guiding principles of neural affective decision theory, 
including connections to and supporting evidence provided by a diverse array of research in both 
psychology and neuroscience. The ANDREA implementation of the theory we describe later 
provides the formal integration of these ideas necessary for our detailed simulation experiments. 
Principle 1. Affect. 
According to our first principle, decision making is a cognitive-affective process, 
crucially dependent on emotional evaluation of potential actions. This claim rejects the 
assumption of traditional mathematical decision theory that choice is a ‘cold’ process involving 
the calculation of expected values and utilities (Kreps, 1990; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1947). The original nineteenth-century concept of utility was a psychologically rich, affective 
one based on pleasure and pain (Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin, 1997). In contrast, twentieth-
century economics adopted the behaviorist view that utilities are mathematical constructions 
based on preferences revealed purely by behavior. There is no room in this view for findings 
observed in both psychological experiments and everyday life that people’s decisions are often 
highly emotional, with preferences arising from having positive feelings for some options and 
negative ones for others. While psychology has introduced a more complex characterization of 
the cognitive processes underlying decision making, the specific influence of affect on behavior   5 
has frequently been ignored. Rottenstreich and Shu (2004) argue that this neglect of affect may 
stem from an original desire of psychological decision researchers to minimize differences with 
the terminology and general themes of classical normative decision theories. 
But there is increasing appreciation in cognitive science that emotions are an integral part 
of decision making (e.g. Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000, 2003; Churchland, 1996; Lerner 
& Keltner, 2000; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure, & 
Cohen, 2006; Slovic, 2002; Wagar & Thagard, 2004). Kahneman (2003, p. 710) argues that 
“there is compelling evidence for the proposition that every stimulus evokes an affective 
evaluation.” Common experience suggests that emotions are both inputs and outputs of decision 
making. Preference for one option over another depends strongly on their relative emotional 
interpretations, and the process of decision making can itself generate emotions such as anxiety 
or relief. The relevance of emotion to decision making is consistent with physiological theories 
that regard emotions as reactions to somatic changes (James, 1894; Damasio, 1994). It also fits 
with some cognitive theories of emotions, which regard them as judgments about the extent to 
which ones goals are being satisfied (Oatley, 1992). From a neurological perspective, it is easy to 
see how emotions can be both cognitive and physiological, as there are numerous 
interconnections among the relevant brain areas. 
Principle 2. Brains. 
According to our second principle, decision making is a neural process driven by 
coordinated dynamic interactions among multiple brain areas, including parts of prefrontal cortex 
as well as major subcortical systems. In particular, activity in brain regions involved in assessing 
and acting upon the appetitive or aversive nature of stimuli (commonly conceptualized as part of 
the brain’s reward system) seems most crucial to understanding judgment and choice behavior   6 
(for a review, see Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure, & Cohen, 2006). Empirical neuroscientific 
investigation of the nature of preference and decision has been developing rapidly, and much 
work today is identifying specific brain areas involved in producing decision-related behaviors 
(e.g., Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, & Shizgal, 2001; Knutson et 
al, 2005; McClure, York & Montague, 2004; Montague & Berns, 2002). This nascent field of 
decision neuroscience represents an exciting frontier of deep exploration into how and why 
people act, think and feel as they do in choice and judgment scenarios (Shiv et al., 2005). 
But taking a neural approach to decision making allows for much more than simply 
identifying brain areas activated in the subjects of behavioral studies. The development of 
biologically plausible theories of how brain areas interact to produce preferences and choices can 
provide more refined mechanistic explanations of decision behaviors. Moreover, investigation at 
the neural level can suggest novel experiments, for example the recent discovery that an odorless 
nasal spray preparation of the neuropeptide oxytocin increases trust in risky choice scenarios, 
including those involving monetary transactions (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 
2005). Such a finding is one that decision neuroscience can reveal, but that would be missed by 
higher level psychological study alone. Neuroscience can thus inform the development of more 
detailed predictions and richer understandings of behavioral-level observations.  
Principle 3. Valuation. 
Our third principle states that the brain forms preferences via interacting but distinct 
mechanisms for positive and negative outcomes, encoded primarily by dopamine and serotonin, 
respectively. There is extensive evidence that midbrain dopamine neurons, such as those in the 
ventral tegmental area and nucleus accumbens, are involved in the computation of a discrepancy 
between the expected and actual rewarding nature of an outcome (e.g., Schultz 1998, 2000; Suri   7 
2002; Knutson et al. 2005), although recent evidence suggests that this activity is only involved 
in the encoding of positive deviations from expectations, that is, getting more than one expected. 
(Bayer & Glimcher, 2005). Daw, Kakade, and Dayan (2002) describe a plausible alternative 
brain mechanism for situations in which one receives less than expected, arguing that serotonin 
innervation from the dorsal raphe nucleus of the brainstem is crucial for producing characteristic 
reactions to negatively valued stimuli and matters being considered (e.g., options in a choice 
scenario). There are thus neurobiological reasons for viewing gains and losses as being encoded 
and subsequently assessed in a fundamentally different manner by the brain, involving distinct 
neural circuits and activation patterns. This provides the basis for our explanation of the central 
finding of prospect theory that losses loom larger than gains. Our neurocomputational model 
ANDREA simulates how interactions of the dopamine and serotonin systems with the amygdala 
and other brain areas may enable this asymmetric assessment of positive and negative outcomes. 
Principle 4. Framing. 
The last principle states that judgments and decisions vary depending on how the context 
and manner of the presentation of information initiate different neural activation patterns. The 
importance of framing is evident from the long history of influential work by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1981, 1986, 2000). They demonstrated that framing a decision in terms of either losses 
or gains can substantially affect the choices that people make, and related phenomena have been 
observed in many real-life arenas such as the stock market and consumer choice (Camerer, 
2000). We contend that framing can be understood even more deeply from the neural-affective 
perspective we propose in our first two principles. The simulation results we describe later show 
how this enriched conception of framing allows for the integration of diverse lines of behavioral 
decision research, as well as the postulation of important new predictions and hypotheses.   8 
We take the concept of framing to encompass any potential effects of the manner or 
context of presentation on decisions and judgments. Following this characterization, such 
findings as preference reversals when outcomes are evaluated jointly versus separately (e.g., 
Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999) might also be considered to be framing results. 
Another such framing effect is illustrated by the ‘trolley-footbridge’ dilemma (e.g., Greene et al., 
2001): most people consider flipping a switch to kill one person instead of five morally justified, 
but consider it immoral to personally push a person into the path of an oncoming trolley, killing 
that person but preventing the trolley from killing five others. We will also explain some of the 
findings of the decision affect theory of Mellers and colleagues (1997) as framing effects that 
differentially activate specific neural systems. 
These four principles make strong claims about the processes that constitute human 
decision making, but alone they are not sufficiently precise to explain particular experimental 
results. We now describe a rigorously defined, biologically realistic neurocomputational model 
that specifies how different brain areas might interact in a manner consistent with neural 
affective decision theory to produce observed behavioral phenomena. 
THE ANDREA MODEL 
A neuropsychological theory consists of a set of hypotheses about how specific brain 
operations produce observed behaviors. Because of the complexity of the brain, computational 
models are indispensable for theoretical neuroscience, both for precisely specifying relevant 
neural structures and activities and for examining their implications through appropriate 
simulation experiments. Litt, Eliasmith, and Thagard (2006) proposed a biologically detailed 
neural model of reward system substrates of valuation and decision. We describe here the 
primary functional components of this model, and introduce several explanatorily valuable   9 
additions regarding neural response characteristics and the complexity of emotional arousal 
encoding. This version of the model we call ANDREA, for Affective Neuroscience of Decision 
through Reward-based Evaluation of Alternatives. 
Our model applies the Neural Engineering Framework (NEF) developed by Eliasmith 
and Anderson (2003), and has been implemented in MATLAB using the NEF simulation 
software NESim (see Appendix A). Neural populations (‘ensembles’) and their firing activities 
are described in the NEF in terms of mathematically precise representations and transformations, 
with the dynamic characteristics of neural computations characterized using the tools of modern 
control theory. Appendix B outlines the exact mathematical nature of representation, 
transformation and dynamics as defined by the NEF. This rigorous, generalized mapping of 
high-level mathematical entities and transformations onto biophysical phenomena such as spike 
patterns and currents allows for biologically constrained computations and dynamics to be 
implemented in physiologically realistic neural populations, and has proven successful in 
modeling phenomena ranging from the swimming of lamprey fish (Eliasmith & Anderson, 2000) 
to the Wason card task from cognitive psychology (Eliasmith, 2005b). 
Figure 1 shows the connectivity structure between the different brain regions we have 
modeled. A comprehensive examination of afferent and efferent transmission among these 
regions would feature many more connections than we have included. The interactions shown 
represent particular paths of coordinated activity that contribute to observed behaviors, rather 
than a full characterization of all relevant neural activity. Appendix A provides details regarding 
the specific numbers of neurons used to model each of these brain areas, as well as the 
physiological parameters used to model individual neurons in each of these populations. Each 
input-output relation symbolized by a connection line in Figure 1 maps onto one or more specific   10 
mathematical transformations, as summarized in Appendix C. We now describe these 
coordinated neural computations as they are relevant to explaining decisions and valuations.  
 
Figure 1: Basic connectivity framework. Dotted arrows represent external inputs to the model. 
Abbreviations: 5-HT, dorsal raphe serotonergic neurons; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; 
AMYG, amygdala; DA, midbrain dopaminergic neurons; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; 
OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; VS, ventral striatum. 
 
Subjective Valuation by Emotional Modulation 
Valuation of alternatives and other information is an essential part of decision making. 
Central to the performance of this task by ANDREA is an interaction between the amygdala and 
orbitofrontal cortex (Fig. 1). Much research has implicated orbitofrontal cortex in the valuation 
of stimuli (e.g., Rolls, 2000; Thorpe, Rolls & Maddison, 1983), particularly in light of its 
extensive connections with sensory processing areas of the brain. Several recent studies have 
indicated an important role for orbitofrontal neurons in providing a sort of “common neural 
currency” (Montague & Berns, 2002) which allows for the evaluation and comparison of 
figurative (or even literal) apples and oranges (Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006). Recent studies 
of the amygdala have challenged its traditional association with mainly aversive stimulus 
processing, showing instead activation based on the degree to which stimuli are salient or 
arousing, rather than a specific valence type (for a review, see McClure, York & Montague, 
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2004). This has inspired a reinterpretation of classic results as indicating that negatively 
appraised events may be in general more emotionally arousing than positive outcomes, perhaps 
because of a need to alter current behavior in response to aversive feedback. In accord with 
research on the role of the amygdala in emotional attention (Adolphs et al., 2005) and 
multiplicative scaling observations for visual attention (e.g., Treue, 2001), ANDREA performs a 
multiplicative modulation by amygdala-encoded emotional arousal of the valuation computation 
performed in orbitofrontal cortex (Fig. 2). That is, orbitofrontal valuations are modeled as being 
multiplicatively dampened or intensified, depending on whether the individual is in a lowered or 
heightened state of affective arousal, respectively. 
Let V represent baseline orbitofrontal stimulus valuation, based on initial sensory and 
cognitive processing and provided as an input in our model. Taking A to represent amygdala-
encoded emotional arousal, we characterize the output subjective valuation S at time t as: 
S(t) = A(t)⋅V(t).            [1] 
Thus, increased levels of emotional arousal will amplify the subjective valuation of stimuli by 
orbitofrontal cortex, while lower arousal levels lead to valuation attenuation. As we discuss in 
our later account of prospect theory, ANDREA also introduces realistic biological constraints 
imposed by neural firing saturation that help to explain valuation behaviors observed in humans, 
an advancement over our earlier reward system model (Litt, Eliasmith, & Thagard, 2006). 
Surprise as Deviation from Expectations 
Figure 2 shows that our model generates amygdala activity upsurges accompanying 
changes in the valuation input to orbitofrontal cortex, and that these upsurges are valence-
asymmetric: negative changes in valuation (losses) produce greater affective arousal increases 
than equivalent positive changes (gains). This neurological behavior is produced mainly through   12 
a modulation of amygdala-encoded emotional arousal by a reward prediction error signal. This 
is simply the discrepancy between expected and actual stimulus valuation, and as such represents 
the effect of the surprising nature of a stimulus on how emotionally arousing it is.  
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Figure 2: Arousal modulation of valuation. a) The “emotionless” input signal to orbitofrontal 
cortex consists here of positive and negative valuation changes of varying magnitude. The 
vertical axis can be interpreted as a sort of neural currency scale: upward steps in the graph thus 
represent gains, while stepping down indicates a loss. Positive/negative sign corresponds to 
appetitive/aversive valence. b) Emotional arousal reflected in amygdala activity. Decoded output 
from spiking neuron populations (see Appendix B). Upsurges correspond to arousal increases 
coinciding with changes in the externally provided stimulus value signal in a), demonstrating the 
role such changes play in influencing emotional engagement. c) Multiplicative modulation of the 
activity presented in a) by that shown in b). Emotional arousal can induce significant changes in 
valuation from the baseline input signal. 
 
For this computation we employ the temporal difference (TD) model (Sutton & Barto, 
1998), due to its simple mathematical structure and robust correspondence with experimental   13 
neural activity observations (e.g., Schultz, 2000). TD computes reward prediction error (E) based 
on the difference between the latest reward valuation and a weighted sum of all previous rewards 
(P). Using our arousal-modulated signal S as the input regarding current stimulus valuation, this 
leads to the modeled recurrent equations 
E(t) = S(t) - P(t - 1)            [2] 
P(t) = P(t - 1) + α ·E(t),           [3] 
where α is a learning rate constant between 0 and 1. This activity has typically been modeled by 
increased midbrain dopamine firing with positive prediction errors (that is, getting more than 
expected) and firing rate depression for negative errors (getting less than expected) (Schultz, 
1998, 2000; Suri, 2002).While this approach seems valid for particular ranges, recent work has 
called into question the feasibility of midbrain dopamine acting alone to perform this 
computation (Daw, Kakade, & Dayan, 2002; Dayan & Balleine, 2002). In particular, such 
physiological constraints as low baseline firing rates make it difficult to envision how activity 
depression could be used to well encode highly negative prediction errors, a concern supported 
by recent experimental findings (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005). 
Accordingly, we adopt an interacting opponent encoding of positive prediction errors by 
midbrain dopamine and negative errors by serotonergic neurons in the dorsal raphe nucleus of 
the brainstem. This is supported by a variety of experimental studies in humans and other 
animals (Deakin, 1983; Evenden & Ryan, 1996; Mobini et al., 2000; Soubrié, 1986; Vertes, 
1991; for a review, see Daw, Kakade, & Dayan, 2002). By separating the encodings of losses 
and gains, we are able to distinctly calibrate the modulatory effects of positive and negative 
valuation changes to provide a plausible neural mechanism for loss aversion (Appendix C). That 
is, asymmetries in loss-gain valuation can be modeled via differing amygdala sensitivity to   14 
inputs from dorsal raphe or midbrain areas, perhaps realized in actual brains through differences 
in specific neurotransmitter receptor concentrations in the amygdala, or similar mechanisms of 
connectivity strength variation (e.g., receptor sensitivity differences). 
Increased Behavioral Saliency of Negative Outcomes 
Valence-asymmetry in emotional arousal is further strengthened in our model through 
the activities we have assigned to the anterior cingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, 
specifically via a proposed dissimilarity in the influences of losses and gains on required 
behavioral planning. Much evidence supports the importance of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in 
the planning, representation and selection of goal-directed behaviors (e.g., Owen, 1997), and the 
anterior cingulate cortex in the detection of conflicts between current behavior and desired or 
expected results, interfacing appropriately with dorsolateral prefrontal in the process (e.g., Bush, 
Luu, & Posner, 2002). We hypothesize an increased behavioral saliency of negative reward 
prediction errors, as such results may indicate that current behavior needs to be modified, rather 
than be simply maintained or strengthened as a positive error would indicate. Such a situation 
would introduce the attendant cognitive resource requirements of new action plan formation and 
execution in response to the displeasing outcome, as well as potential environmental risks 
stemming from altering current behavior. We model this increased behavioral saliency through a 
corresponding increase in emotional arousal (Appendix C). Thus, feedback from dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate to the amygdala in our model further increases the 
affective influence of losses over similarly sized gains. 
In combination with the previously discussed roles of dopamine and serotonin in 
influencing the amygdala, we arrive at our final characterization of how emotional arousal A is   15 
influenced by the saliency of unexpected gains and losses, as well as potential behavioral 
modification costs associated with the latter: 
      A(t) = A1(t) + β ·DA(t) + γ ·5-HT(t) + C(t).      [4] 
A1 represents a degree of emotional arousal determined by external factors unrelated to reward 
prediction error or the described dorsolateral-cingulate contribution. In previous work we have 
provided this as a straightforward input signal to the model (Litt, Eliasmith, & Thagard, 2006). 
We shall describe later how ANDREA expands A1 arousal by incorporating prior expectations 
regarding valuation targets, which allows for a neurobiological explanation of decision affect 
theory (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997). DA and 5-HT are the opponent encodings of 
positive and negative reward prediction error, respectively, with γ chosen to be a connection-
strength constant greater than β to simulate an increased influence of serotonin-encoded losses 
over dopamine-encoded gains on emotional state. Finally, C represents the additional costs 
associated with losses that increase their behavioral saliency, and hence emotional import, as 
determined by activity in the anterior cingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices. 
A NEURAL ACCOUNT OF PROSPECT THEORY 
Prospect theory, a theoretical framework for understanding risky choice developed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1982, 2000), has been applied to many preference and choice 
behaviors commonly exhibited by people. The most famous such phenomenon is loss aversion, 
whereby people behave asymmetrically in their personal valuations of objectively equivalent 
losses and gains. Central to prospect theory’s resolution of this and other inconsistencies between 
classical decision research and actual behavior is a redefined characterization of the nature of 
subjective evaluations of decision outcomes. The resulting value function proposed by the theory 
has the following essential characteristics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman,   16 
1984): i) subjective value is defined on gains and losses—that is, deviations from a neutral 
reference point—rather than on total wealth, as is typical of expected utility theory; ii) the value 
function is concave for gains and convex for losses; and iii) the curve is steeper for losses than 
gains. Taken together, an asymmetric sigmoid value function is the well-known result (Fig. 3).  
 
Figure 3: A hypothetical prospect theory value function, illustrating subjective valuation 
commonalities observed in tests of numerous subjects. 
 
Loss Aversion 
Neural affective decision theory, via the ANDREA model, provides a compelling 
explanation of loss aversion. The combination of arousal modulation of subjective valuation and 
the increased affective import of losses produces emotionally-influenced orbitofrontal valuations 
that overweight losses. This can be seen in Figure 2, and even more vividly in the simplified 
simulation of Figure 4. The resulting effects on thinking and behavior would produce the 
asymmetries in peoples’ evaluations of and responses to gains and losses that have been 
documented and explained by prospect theory.    17 
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Figure 4: Unbalanced evaluation of gains and losses. a) The input signal to orbitofrontal cortex 
consists of positive and negative changes in value of equal magnitude. b) Arousal level 
modulated by prediction error and likely behavioral saliency of stimuli. The loss induces a much 
greater arousal increase than the equal gain. c) The outcome of the unevenness displayed in b). 
Reductions in stimulus valuation (losses) are disproportionately amplified compared to gains. 
 
We turn now to extending this neural account of loss aversion into a detailed biological 
explanation for the specific shape of prospect theory’s sigmoid value function. 
The Value Function of Prospect Theory 
In developing a neural theory of preference that meshes with the behaviorally inspired 
prospect theory value function, the first step is to identify brain regions that should be expected 
to produce responses corresponding to the sorts of behaviors monitored in psychological studies 
of preference and valuation. As discussed earlier, it seems natural to look to orbitofrontal cortex 
as the site of activity mapping directly onto people’s subjective valuations of gains and losses. It 
has been implicated strongly in tasks related to valuation and comparison of outcomes, events 
and perceived stimuli in general, and we have described a fundamental affective modulation of 
this encoding that may form the basis of the subjective nature of ultimate outcome valuation.   18 
The next step is to identify features of the ANDREA model that might explain the 
specific nature of the sigmoid value function, as described previously in terms of three primary 
characteristics (Fig. 3). Feature i) of the curve, valuation in terms of reference point deviation, 
identifies the sort of input signal to be modulated in orbitofrontal cortex. Since the degree to 
which a stimulus is considered a loss or a gain is a representation of its divergence from a neutral 
reference, evaluating such changes in value calls for a step-style input, similar to those shown in 
Figures 2 and 4, where the subjective valuation of a deviation of size X will be determined by the 
emotional modulation produced by an input valuation step from 0 to X. For example, to produce 
orbitofrontal activity corresponding to the subjective valuation of a loss of $200, we measure the 
emotionally modulated output from orbitofrontal cortex to a step input that moves from 0 (the 
reference point) to our target value (-200). Leaving aside feature ii) for a moment, the third 
aspect of the prospect theory value curve, a steeper slope for losses than gains, is simply loss 
aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The biological account of loss aversion we previously 
described will thus serve as a critical component of our neural explanation of the S-curve. 
The second feature of the sigmoid value function, the leveling off of loss and gain 
valuations at the extremes, requires appeal to additional neurological mechanisms. In particular, 
we introduce the notion of neural saturation. Any type of neuron has hard biological constraints 
on how fast it can fire. Each action potential is followed by a refractory period of repolarization 
during which the neuron cannot fire, and issues such as cellular respiration requirements and 
local neurotransmitter depletion introduce unavoidable limitations on spike rates. In the context 
of neurocomputation in the NEF (and hence ANDREA), this means that the range of values that 
can be encoded by any neural population is limited. This inherent restriction can actually serve 
an explanatory purpose in the case of the prospect theory value function. To explain how   19 
ANDREA could produce leveling-off valuations at the extremes, note that we encode values 
through increasing neural spike rates in the encoding population as these values become larger 
(in either the positive or negative direction). Thus, in attempting to provide subjective valuations 
for very large gains or losses, neurons in orbitofrontal cortex will begin to saturate, as they 
simply cannot fire fast enough to produce linearly distinctive affective responses to increasingly 
large value deviations. 
An alternative encoding of value magnitude through activated population size, rather than 
the firing levels of a fixed population, would seem to deny this saturation-based account of 
diminishing marginal sensitivity. Such a scheme might be akin to accumulator models that have 
been applied to numerosity encoding in intraparietal regions (Roitman, Brannon, & Platt, 2007). 
However, applying this approach to valuation encoding seems less plausible from a 
neurophysiological resources perspective; while the salient brain areas do have millions of 
neurons, all of these would require direct connectivity to areas interpreting magnitude 
information in order to impart the same information as naturally rate-tuned transmitter release by 
a population which encodes magnitude via firing rates. Indeed, accumulator models generally 
allow for cardinal value encodings on restricted integer scales such as 2-to-32, rather than the 
potentially arbitrary and quasi-analog scale on which valuations often lie. 
Figure 5 illustrates the results of running simulations based on the preceding description. 
Each data point at X along the horizontal axes of 5b and 5c is the result of measuring a 
modulated orbitofrontal valuation output in a simulation providing orbitofrontal cortex a step 
input from 0 to X, in accord with the reference-deviation characterization of value in prospect 
theory. As expected, the effects of loss aversion are clear, with the slope differential indicating a 
greater affective impact of losses over equivalent gains. The 2:1 slope ratio observed here for   20 
moderate losses and gains mirrors behavioral evidence in the decision literature (e.g., Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). Finally, the concavity features of the value function have been 
successfully replicated in these simulations. Figure 6 shows the specific role of neural saturation 
in this regard. Each row in these spike rasters represents an individual orbitofrontal cortex 
neuron, and each point represents a single action potential at a specific point in time produced by 
the neuron in question. Clearly, equal changes in the size of a loss or gain do not necessarily 
produce similar changes in neural spiking, particularly as neurons begin to saturate. This causes a 
decreasing distinctness in firing response at the extremes, which we propose as the neurological 
basis for the leveling-off in loss and gain valuation observed in behavioral studies. Overall, the 
mechanisms we have outlined combine to produce a detailed, biologically plausible neural 
explanation of the nature of the value function described by prospect theory.   21 
 
Figure 5: Value function simulation results. a) A typical prospect theory value function. b) 
Subjective valuation outputs from orbitofrontal cortex. Each data point represents the 
emotionally modulated valuation of the loss or gain value chosen along the horizontal axis. c) 
Close-up of the central portion of b), showing the differing slopes for loss and gain valuations.   22 
 
Figure 6: Orbitofrontal cortex spike rasters. Note the clear difference in activity between a) and 
b) (a 52% increase in immediate post-event spiking). This is in contrast to the relative similarity 
in spiking in b) and c) forced by neural saturation, as the $50 change moves farther away from 
the reference value of 0. This response characteristic forms the basis of our neural explanation 
for the concavity features of the prospect theory value function. 
 
Framing through Reference Value Manipulation 
Understanding how individuals respond differently depending on the manner in which 
information regarding a situation is presented is considered to be one of the primary explanatory 
successes of prospect theory. A famous illustration of the power of framing is the presentation of 
two different choice-sets to subjects regarding the consequences of different plans to handle the 
outbreak of a disease expected to kill 600 people (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986): 
Problem 1:  Program A – 200 people will be saved. 
    Program B – 1/3 probability 600 are saved, 2/3 probability nobody is saved.   23 
Problem 2:  Program C – 400 people will die. 
    Program D – 1/3 probability nobody will die, 2/3 probability 600 will die. 
Faced with the choice in Problem 1, 72 percent of subjects chose Program A over B, whereas 
only 22 percent of subjects chose Program C over D when faced with Problem 2. Clearly, 
though, Programs A and C are objectively equivalent, as are their respective alternatives. The 
framing of situations in terms of losses or gains may thus cause dramatic reversals of preference 
in decision scenarios. 
The mechanisms implemented in the ANDREA model provide a realistic neural basis for 
such framing effects. We describe means by which objectively equivalent outcomes can produce 
markedly different subjective valuations in orbitofrontal cortex, depending on the manner in 
which each is framed. In particular, note that feature i) of the prospect theory value function, the 
definition of subjective valuation on deviations from some neutral reference value, points 
towards an obvious mechanism for the framing of decisions: variation of the reference value 
itself. In the disease example, Problem 1 is framed in terms of lives saved rather than lives lost, 
while the reverse is true for Problem 2. Thus, choosing “zero” reference points from which 
subjective valuations shall deviate in each case should lead to different values for each problem. 
For Problem 1, “zero lives saved” would indeed correspond to 0 on a scale measuring the total 
number of people of our original 600 who are expected to be left alive after the choice of a given 
program for combating the disease. Crucially, however, the “zero lives lost” reference point for 
Problem 2 would correspond to the value 600 when measured on this same scale, since 600 out 
of 600 people alive indicates that no lives have been lost, as required. 
Thus, in the case of the Program A option in Problem 1, a subjective valuation deviation 
described as “200 people out of 600 will be saved” represents a positive-direction deviation from   24 
0 lives saved to 200 lives saved. In contrast, the objectively equivalent Program C option in 
Problem 2, described as “400 people out of 600 will die”, represents a negative-direction 
deviation from 0 lives lost to 400 lives lost, that is, from 600 left alive down to 200 left alive. 
Note that both deviation construals end at the value 200 on the scale of people still alive, since 
they are objectively equivalent outcomes. Nevertheless, because of our multiplicative modulation 
of valuation deviations by emotional arousal, opposite directions of deviation will produce 
subjective valuations that are emotionally amplified in opposite directions. Figure 7 illustrates 
the results of characterizing this type of framing as a manipulation of the deviation reference 
point. We obtain a subjective valuation of orbitofrontal step-input corresponding to Program A 
that is much more positive than that of a step-input corresponding to Program C, simply because 
of opposite directions of emotional modulation. This would explain the preference reversal that 
occurs upon switching decision frames, as what was seen as a gain in comparison to one 
reference value is suddenly evaluated as a loss in comparison to a different referent. Later we 
will discuss framing effects that operate in ways other than varying reference values, and how 
these different sorts of framing can in combination explain the observed interactions between 
affect, prior expectations and counterfactual comparisons explored in decision affect theory.    25 
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Figure 7: Simulation results for framing in terms of gains and losses. a) Objectively equivalent 
outcomes (ending up with 200 people alive) evaluated as deviations from different reference 
points. The thin-lined step input represents Problem 1/Program A, and the heavy line Problem 
2/Program C (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). b) Opposite directions of deviation produce 
opposite directions of emotional amplification in subjective valuation, leading to more a positive 
outlook towards Program A than Program C. 
 
Predictions 
Our neurological explanation of prospect theory suggests a range of testable neural-level 
predictions and hypotheses. Litt, Eliasmith and Thagard (2006) outline several such predictions 
in relation to loss aversion and the behavioral influence of serotonin. For example, the extent of a 
particular individual’s hypersensitivity to losses is hypothesized to be correlated with the 
concentration in the amygdala of a specific serotonin receptor subtype, which would influence 
the degree to which negative reward prediction errors affect amygdala activity. As well, 
degraded connectivity between midbrain dopamine neurons and the raphe serotonin system is 
predicted to increase emotionally influenced overvaluation of both gains and losses, due to 
mutual attenuation effects that we have modeled between these systems. Such correlation 
between loss and gain sensitivity has indeed been shown in recent work .by Tom and colleagues 
(2007). The particular neural activity they describe suggests the mechanism underlying this   26 
relationship may involve important additions to the computations captured in the ANDREA 
model, such as the effects of noradrenergic circuits. 
Further empirical investigation of the neural correlates of loss aversion can provide more 
such tests and potential falsifications of the relationships proposed in ANDREA, although 
practical barriers to imaging brain stem serotonergic activity limit the capacity of the approach of 
the Tom et al. study in this respect. Additionally, this work and other explorations of “prospect 
theory on the brain” by this team did not show any significant amygdala activity relevant to loss 
aversion (Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007; Trepel, Fox, & Poldrack, 2005). Besides the 
studies we have previously cited that indicate an important role for the amygdala in emotional 
valuation, significant amygdala activity directly corresponding to loss aversion has contrastingly 
been directly observed in other fMRI experiments (e.g., Weber et al., 2007). Such discrepancies 
and limitations might be resolved by employing alternative experimental techniques; for 
instance, it is possible to temporarily diminish cerebral serotonin levels by an ingestion of a 
tryptophan depleting drink (Cools et al., 2005), which our model suggests would specifically 
diminish loss aversion. Depletion studies of decision-related phenomena hold much promise for 
testing the validity of neurocomputational models like ANDREA, as well as advancing our 
understanding of the biological bases of complex behaviors and cognitions. Various other 
anomalous choice-related behaviors arising from specific disconnections and damage patterns 
are also described by Litt, Eliasmith and Thagard (2006). The enriched conceptions of decision 
phenomena provided by neural-level exploration allow for postulation of potential influences on 
behavior that would be missed by studies restricted to examining higher-level psychological 
processing.   27 
A straightforward set of additional predictions deriving from our ANDREA simulations 
would be expectations of activation of the brain regions described in our model (Fig. 1) to be 
observed in imaging experiments involving people performing preference and choice tasks. But a 
more interesting explanatory and predictive utility of the model involves the study of individual 
differences in value functions. While the general features of the curve have been reproduced by 
many different experiments and in large numbers of people, the specific functions of different 
individuals are known to vary widely (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Because our 
simulations essentially represent the value function produced by a single brain (to which we have 
complete access, as its designers and builders) the model offers biological reasons for why and 
how individual value functions vary, while preserving some common general features. As 
discussed previously, connectivity strength between dorsal raphe serotonin and the amygdala can 
influence loss aversion, and thus the nature of the subjective valuations performed in 
orbitofrontal cortex. In persons with heightened serotonin sensitivity in the amygdala, we would 
expect to see a value function with an even steeper slope for losses than that of gains. The 
opposite also holds, in terms of lessened serotonergic influence or stronger midbrain 
dopaminergic connectivity, with either of these cases predictive of less discrepancy in slope 
between losses and gains (i.e., reduced loss aversion). The damaged innervation between the 
raphe and midbrain mentioned earlier would have the effect of steepening both the loss and gain 
portions of the curve, although the slope ratio might be unaffected. These connectivity 
manipulations can be understood psychologically as altering the extent to which one is 
emotionally aroused by losses and gains, with this affective influence central to producing 
subjective valuations of these deviations from a reference point.   28 
We also predict that specific neural saturation range differences between brains may 
underlie individual differences in value function shape, with more readily saturating orbitofrontal 
populations prone to producing curves that level off quicker and more markedly. In the NEF, this 
saturation can itself be modeled asymmetrically around 0, so we can readily create a neural 
system of specific architecture and connectivity that yields significant leveling-off for losses but 
much less so for gains, or vice versa. In sum, the ANDREA model allows for numerous 
experimentally testable neural-level predictions regarding prospect theoretic behavior. 
A NEURAL ACCOUNT OF DECISION AFFECT THEORY 
The hedonic influence of prior expectations and counterfactual comparisons on the 
subjective valuation of outcomes is characterized by the work of Mellers and colleagues on what 
they call decision affect theory (Mellers & McGraw, 2001; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 
1997; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999). Its fundamental claim is that evaluation by an 
individual of an outcome, event or decision option is strongly influenced by the “relative 
pleasure” it is considered to provide (Mellers, 2000). This relativity derives in part from the 
effects of counterfactual comparisons, as illustrated by the finding that Olympic silver medalists 
are more likely to feel disappointed than bronze medalists because of generally higher personal 
expectations (McGraw, Mellers, & Tetlock, 2005). Another factor is the degree to which an 
obtained outcome is considered surprising, with greater emotional impact for unexpected results 
(either good or bad) than for expected outcomes. The mathematical expression of decision affect 
theory is 
      RO = J[uO + d(uO – uE) ∗ (1 – sO)]         [5] 
(cf. equation [1] in McGraw, Mellers, & Tetlock, 2005). RO is the emotional feeling associated 
with the obtained outcome and J is a linear function relating the felt pleasure to a specific   29 
numerical response. uO and uE are the respective utilities of the obtained and expected outcomes, 
and d(uO – uE) is a disappointment function that models how the obtained outcome is compared 
to the alternative expected outcome. sO is the subjectively judged probability of the obtained 
outcome actually occurring, so the weighting by the complementary (1 – sO) term models the 
degree to which the obtained outcome was not expected (i.e., the subjective probability that 
something else would occur). The importance of emotional influence becomes clear with the 
finding that people will choose what feels best—that is, make decisions in such a manner as to 
maximize average positive emotional experience (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997). 
Thus feelings about outcomes and choices, and hence the decisions people may be 
expected to make, are greatly influenced by the size and valence of the discrepancy between 
anticipated and actual results. The expected emotional reaction to gaining $20 will be vastly 
different if the prior expectation is gaining $100, versus the case where the expected yield is only 
$1. Indeed, the degree of influence of this discrepancy from anticipated results is such that an 
objectively worse outcome can sometimes be more pleasurable than one which is better. 
Consider the easily imaginable experience of feeling happier in stumbling across a twenty-dollar 
bill while walking home from work than from receiving an underwhelming one percent raise the 
same day, despite the monetary value of the raise being significantly higher than that of the 
found note. Decision affect theory thus describes in a revealing and systematic fashion the nature 
of certain situations in which less can actually feel like more. In describing a neural basis for the 
theory suggested by ANDREA, we shall draw upon an integration of the sort of framing 
discussed in our examination of prospect theory with the effects of the emotional context of 
information presentation on valuation and choice, which we now explore in depth.   30 
Framing through Direct Emotional Arousal Influence 
Our earlier discussion of framing effects focused on the type most discussed in prospect 
theory, concerning alternative descriptions of losses and gains. However, framing can affect 
decisions in other ways, as in the trolley-footbridge experiments of Greene and colleagues 
(2001). These experiments are not reference value manipulations, and are therefore not 
explainable by the neural mechanisms that we described for prospect theory. The judgment of 
morality reversal occurs between two outcomes that are both described as killing one person to 
save five others. The manipulation involved here is not one of reference point, but rather the 
personal or impersonal nature of the specific action performed that leads to the described 
outcome. It is thus differing contexts of choice presentation (i.e., the nature of the situation story) 
that produce the change in situational evaluation, rather than any suggestive presentation of 
choices in terms of either losses or gains. We will call this emotional-context framing, in contrast 
to the reference-value framing we discussed in relation to prospect theory. 
We propose that emotional-context framing in the trolley-footbridge dilemma occurs 
through increased arousal associated with the direct, personalized action of pushing a person to 
their death, compared to the more detached and impersonal act of flipping a switch that will 
cause a trolley to divert from hitting five people towards hitting a single person. Such an increase 
in emotional engagement induces greater amplification of the subjective evaluation of causing a 
death in the personal case, which would provide a neurological basis for the reversal in typical 
judgments of the morality of the actions in question. fMRI experiments by Greene and 
colleagues seem to support this neural account of the trolley-footbridge dilemma, showing 
increased amygdala and orbitofrontal activity in cases of highly personal characterizations of 
morally debatable actions (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 2004).   31 
Figure 8 illustrates the neural explanation we have described for the type of framing 
produced by changing the emotional context of the presented information. Just as for reference-
value framing, we get different subjective valuations for scenarios that have identical objective 
values, which would allow for preference reversals to occur when the decision frame is altered. 
The primary difference is that this mechanism employs a direct manipulation of emotional 
arousal state, whereas our neural basis for the reference-value framing caused emotional 
modulation changes indirectly though manipulation of valuation-deviation reference points.  
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Figure 8: Simulation results for framing that changes emotional context. a) A step input to 
orbitofrontal cortex indicating a negative change in value, such as the consideration of a situation 
in which one’s actions cause the death another person. b) Two different base arousal inputs to 
the amygdala, corresponding to differing levels of context-produced emotional engagement. c) 
Because of differing base arousal levels, arousal upsurges corresponding to the negative 
valuation deviation differ as well. d) Higher context-motivated base arousal leads to greater 
amplification of the subjective valuation change, and thus a belief that the more arousing 
scenario is actually worse than the objectively equivalent but less arousing scenario. 
   32 
Decision Affect Theory as an Integrated Framing Phenomenon 
Explanation of the experimental results examined in decision affect theory requires both 
reference-value framing and emotional-context framing. The hedonic impact of counterfactual 
comparisons can be produced by setting the reference point of the valuation deviation for an 
obtained outcome to the value of the unobtained counterfactual result, which is exactly 
reference-value framing. Then winning $20 when the counterfactual comparison is a $100 win 
would be construed as a loss, whereas a counterfactual comparison to winning only $1 would 
reframe the $20 win as a gain. In addition, the degree to which the obtained outcome was 
unexpected can have the effect of emotional-context framing. We formally model this in 
ANDREA by having emotional context influence neural behavior through the arousal input A1 
(see equation [4]) in a manner that takes into account the perceived probability of the obtained 
outcome X actually occurring: 
      A1(t) = A0(t) + λ ·(1 – P[outcome X]).      [6] 
In this enriched conception of emotional arousal, A0 fills the previous role of A1 as a base arousal 
level determined by external factors and provided as an input to the model. A1 emotional arousal 
is now explicitly increased in inverse proportion to the expected probability of obtaining the 
outcome under consideration. Surprising, low-probability outcomes produce higher arousal than 
unsurprising outcomes, where 1 – P[X] is closer to 0. The constant multiplier λ may be related to 
the relative affect-richness of the outcome in question, as this variable seems strongly related to 
the degree to which uncertainty affects valuations (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001). 
This direct manipulation of base emotional arousal is a formalization of emotional-
context framing, in this case a context related to outcome uncertainty. It and reference-value 
framing, implemented in ANDREA by the mechanisms described earlier, together produce the   33 
canonical finding of decision affect theory that objectively worse outcomes can sometimes feel 
better than more advantageous alternatives (Fig. 9). The mechanisms described above and 
illustrated in Figure 9 allow us to map the standard mathematical model of decision affect theory 
(equation [5]) onto specific neural structures and computations. The calculation of subjective 
utilities and their subsequent comparison, as embodied in the d(uO – uE) term in equation [5], are 
performed neurologically through step-functional deviation in orbitofrontal cortex exactly as we 
modeled for prospect theoretic subjective valuation. The ‘disappointment’ effects of comparing 
obtained and expected outcome valuations result from prediction error computations by 
dopamine and serotonin networks feeding back to influence emotional arousal encoded in the 
amygdala, which in turn modulates orbitofrontal valuations. The subjective probability 
augmentation to our arousal representation (equation [6]) is identical to the (1 – sO) surprise term 
in the decision affect theory model of Mellers and colleagues. In combination with our 
multiplicative modulation of valuation by affective arousal (equation [1]), it is clear that this 
enhancement also has similar mathematical effects to that of for the surprise term in equation [5].    34 
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Figure 9: Decision affect theory as an integration of framing ideas. a) Counterfactual 
comparisons between obtained and unobtained outcomes are encoded through appropriate setting 
of valuation deviation reference points, as in reference-value framing. b) The surprising natures 
of obtained outcomes are encoded through direct manipulation of base emotional arousal input, 
as in emotional-context framing (equation [5]). c) The effect of surprise can outweigh an 
objectively larger valuation deviation, producing greater hedonic intensity for a surprising 
smaller gain than an unsurprising larger one in this case. d) The subjective valuation of an 
objectively worse outcome is greater than that of the better outcome, because of the added 
pleasure of being surprised by the smaller gain here. 
 
Figures 10 and 11 show the results of more comprehensive simulations of the behavioral 
findings of Mellers and colleagues (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997). In Figure 10, the 
value of the unobtained counterfactual comparison outcome is held constant at $0 (i.e., neither 
losing nor gaining money) while the obtained outcome value and the expected probability of   35 
obtaining that outcome are varied. Figure 11 describes an opposing experiment where the $0 is 
the unvarying obtained outcome—that is, subjects neither lose nor gain any money. What is 
instead varied is the expected probability of obtaining this $0 outcome and the value of the 
unobtained outcome used as a counterfactual comparison. In both figures and in both the 
behavioral and ANDREA simulation results, lower-probability curves (corresponding to 
surprising obtained outcomes) produce more intense affective experiences, as reflected by more 
extreme emotional response ratings. As well, there are cases in both the behavioral findings and 
our simulation data where an objectively worse outcome produces a more positive emotional 
response than one which is objectively greater. For instance, both Figures 10a and 10b show 
more elation from winning $17.50 instead of $0 with an expected probability of such a win of 
only 0.09 than for winning $31.50 instead of $0 when the anticipated probability of this outcome 
is 0.94. The surprising smaller gain feels better than the unexpected larger gain. Our proposed 
neural basis for decision affect theory thus provides a plausible and thorough biological 
characterization of the phenomenon.   36 
 
Figure 10: Comparing behavioral and simulation results in decision affect theory. a) Behavioral 
findings of Mellers et al., 1997, for lotteries with a constant $0 unobtained counterfactual 
comparison and varying obtained outcomes and expected obtained outcome probability. 
Emotional response was reported by subjects by ratings of feelings on a scale of 50 (extreme 
elation) to -50 (extreme disappointment) b) Results of model simulations of the Mellers et al. 
experiment in a), with data points determined through simulations in line with our proposed 
neural basis for decision affect theory (Fig. 9).   37 
 
 
Figure 11: Comparing behavioral and simulation results in decision affect theory, opposite 
experiment to that described in Figure 10. a) Behavioral findings of Mellers et al., 1997, for 
lotteries with constant $0 obtained outcome and varying unobtained counterfactual comparison 
outcome value and expected obtained outcome probability. b) Model simulation of the 
experiment in a), with data points determined through simulations in line with our proposed 
neural basis for decision affect theory (Fig. 9).   38 
We have been able to explain the central findings of decision affect theory using the same 
mechanisms that we applied to the phenomena explained by prospect theory, with the addition of 
framing by emotional context. A major motivating factor for the exploration of any subject at 
more basic levels of explanation is the desire to unite findings that are disconnected at higher 
levels of study through a set of shared lower-level mechanisms. In this vein, an important 
undertaking in the neuroscientific exploration of the psychology of preference and choice is to 
uncover shared underpinnings for phenomena that have yet to be rigorously tied together at the 
behavioral level. ANDREA demonstrates such a means to connect decision affect theory and 
prospect theory via the two neural mechanisms for framing we have outlined. 
Predictions 
There are undoubtedly other kinds of framing besides the reference-value and emotional-
context types that we have discussed. Additional brain mechanisms may be required to explain 
other cases in which differing modes of identical information presentation produce divergent 
results, such as the case of reversals in preference when options are considered jointly versus 
separately (e.g., Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999). Emotional-context framing 
could also be relevant to explaining a prominent result in constructive memory research. In the 
car accident study by Loftus and Palmer (1974), they describe significant effects on speed-of-
impact memory judgments by subjects based simply on the emotiveness of the action verb used 
to describe the collision between two cars (“contacted each other” producing lower remembered 
speed judgments than “smashed into each other”). This seems analogous to the baseline 
emotional arousal manipulation inherent in our second neural framing mechanism, which in turn 
causes increasingly amplified subjective valuations that would correspond to inflated speed 
judgments by subjects when asked more emotively framed questions by Loftus and Palmer.   39 
Further predictions arising from the framing mechanisms we have described relate to 
how the neural activity making up these mechanisms, and hence the effects of framing, could be 
induced without performing explicit decision framing. For instance, it might be possible to 
manipulate default subjective valuation reference points either upwards or downwards via 
positive or negative priming, or perhaps even through direct neuropharmacological intervention 
to influence orbitofrontal activity. This could potentially produce effects similar to reference-
value framing in a less conspicuous manner. Similarly for emotional-context framing, 
manipulation of affective arousal in a manner wholly unrelated to situation context could cause 
“bleed-over” effects identical to those produced by situation-related arousal modulation. 
Methods of manipulation include prior exposure to violent or sexual imagery, relaxing or 
stressful preceding tasks, and direct pharmacological modulation of amygdala activity. There is a 
wide variety of means by which brain activity similar or identical to our mechanisms of framing 
can be induced either behaviorally or neurochemically, and we predict that such alternative 
routes should produce behaviors in people similar to explicit framing effects, regardless of 
whether or not they are aware of how they are being influenced. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
We have shown how neural affective decision theory, as stated in our four principles and 
as implemented in the ANDREA model, can account for the central phenomena described by 
prospect theory and decision affect theory. Our view of the general process of decision making is 
summarized in Figure 12. People are presented with a decision problem by verbal or perceptually 
experienced descriptions which they must interpret based on the context in which the decision is 
being made, resulting in an overall representation of the problem that is both cognitive and 
emotional. Options, outcomes, and goals can be encoded by verbal and other cognitive   40 
representations, but with an ineliminable emotional content; in particular, goals are emotionally 
tagged. The translation of the presentation of a problem and its context into an internal cognitive-
emotional representation produces framing effects, because different representations will invoke 
different neural-affective evaluations. ANDREA shows how these evaluations can be computed 
by coordinated activity among multiple brain areas, especially the orbitofrontal cortex, the 
amygdala, and dopamine and serotonin systems involved in encoding positive and negative 
changes in valuation. The result is decisions that select options inducing the highest emotional 
subjective valuations.  
 
Figure 12. Overview of neural affective decision theory. 
 
ANDREA has greater explanatory scope than other neurocomputational models of 
decision and reward that have focused on in-depth modeling of more restricted subsystems of the 
brain, and accordingly limited ranges of behavioral phenomena. Two such examples are the 
model of reward association reversal in orbitofrontal cortex by Deco and Rolls (2005) and the 
GAGE model of cognitive-affective integration in the Iowa gambling task and self-evaluations of 
physiologically ambiguous emotional states (Wagar & Thagard, 2004). Additionally, a 
straightforward diffusion decision process implemented in superior colliculus cells seems able to 
accurately characterize accuracy and reaction time in simple two-choice decision tasks (Ratcliff, 
Cherian, & Segraves, 2003). Task modeling of this sort is important for exploring basic details of 
neural mechanisms for specific phenomena, but examining brain processes on a larger scale is   41 
required for explaining more complex and wide-ranging psychological findings, such as prospect 
theory and decision affect theory. Busemeyer and Johnson (2004) describe a connectionist model 
that they apply to a range of behaviors as diverse as those explored by ANDREA, including 
preference reversal effects and loss aversion. The network model called affective balance theory 
(Grossberg & Gutowski, 1987) also explores a wide range of risky decision phenomena in a 
mathematically sophisticated fashion, and proposes effects of emotional context on cognitive 
processing that are largely consistent with those implemented in ANDREA. The main 
improvement that our approach offers over these two models is in neurological realism, as 
reflected by modeled characteristics of individual processing units (‘neurons’) and the mapping 
of proposed computations onto specific brain regions and interactions supported by empirical 
findings. The models of Grossberg and Gutowski (1987) and Busemeyer and Johnson (2004) are 
not comparable in this respect to either ANDREA or the previously mentioned works of Deco 
and Rolls (2005) and Wagar and Thagard (2004). This of course is not a criticism of such 
methods of modeling. Rather, it is more of an indication of the different levels at which 
theoreticians can formulate explanations of behaviorally studied psychological phenomena.  
While the proposed mechanisms are interesting from the larger perspective of computational 
models of decision making, these artificial neural networks are of a fundamentally different 
nature than ANDREA and similar models in computational cognitive neuroscience. 
A recent model of decision-related interactions between basal ganglia and orbitofrontal 
cortex by Frank and Claus (2006) recognizes the utility of taking the sort of broad-scale 
approach we employ in our design of ANDREA, and maintains a similar level of neurological 
realism and detail. Despite certain similarities regarding modeled brain regions and proposed 
computations, this model diverges from ANDREA in several fundamental ways, leading to both   42 
different mechanisms and different explanatory targets for each of our models. After briefly 
describing the structure of the Frank and Claus (2006) model, we compare it in detail with our 
own model of valuation and choice phenomena. 
The main focus of the Frank and Claus model is the means by which basal ganglia 
dopaminergic activity and orbitofrontal computations enable adaptive decision making 
responsive to contextual information. Computation and representation of expected decision value 
information is accomplished through a division of labor between subcortical dopamine and 
prefrontal networks. A basal ganglia dopaminergic network learns to make decisions based on 
the relative probability of such decisions leading to positive outcomes. This process is 
augmented by orbitofrontal circuits that provide a working memory representation of associated 
reinforcer value magnitudes that exercises top-down control on the basal ganglia activity, which 
allows more flexible response to rapidly changing inputs. The proposed computations are 
detailed, elegant and well-supported by empirical data, and the model is effective in explaining 
decision-related behaviors as diverse as risk aversion/seeking, reversal learning, and peoples’ 
performance in a variant of the Iowa gambling task in both normal and brain-damaged scenarios. 
While ANDREA does not implement the specific computations proposed by Frank and 
Claus (2006), this is due more to differing targets of explanation than to any major 
inconsistencies in our respective conceptions of the roles of various brain regions in decision 
making. Both models describe important functional differences between orbitofrontal-amygdala 
networks and dopaminergic activity in line with empirical findings demonstrating the 
involvement of orbitofrontal cortex in valuation and dopaminergic encoding of reward prediction 
error. How these subsystems might interact is a question that both ANDREA and Frank and 
Claus (2006) address, and one that has been neglected in previous theoretical modeling of the   43 
neurobiology of reward. Nevertheless, whereas Frank and Claus develop a comprehensive 
characterization of how orbitofrontal cortex learns and represents reinforcer value, our goal is to 
describe how specific external influences differentially alter the magnitudes of these 
orbitofrontal-encoded values, such as via the asymmetric emotional modulation by losses and 
gains on valuations that we describe as the basis of loss aversion in prospect theory. As a result, 
the models are best suited to providing neural explanations of different psychological 
phenomena, and where they address similar phenomena they do so with contrasting emphases on 
specific relevant brain mechanisms. 
The most prominent difference is that of representational complexity of amygdala 
activity. In both models, the amygdala encodes the magnitude of losses and gains in proportion 
to overall activity level, which then influences orbitofrontal representations of reward values. 
Frank and Claus (2006) do not explore how the amygdala forms such representations of 
reinforcer magnitude, providing them instead as direct model inputs. In contrast, ANDREA 
models multifaceted means by which emotional arousal related to outcome magnitude is encoded 
by the amygdala (equations [4] and [5]). This allows for the postulation of neural explanations 
for phenomena not addressed by Frank and Claus (2006), such as multiple mechanisms for 
framing and the observations of decision affect theory. In addition, while both models describe 
loss aversion as resulting from greater amygdala activation by losses than equivalent gains, 
ANDREA offers specific neurological reasons of how this might occur through differential 
calibration of distinct loss and gain reward prediction error networks, as well as feedback to the 
amygdala from dorsolateral and cingulate processing of behavioral saliency. Our detailed 
characterization of how the amygdala comes to represent magnitude information thus allows us   44 
to both explain additional phenomena and provide more complete biological mechanisms for 
valuation and decision behaviors simulated by both models. 
Important structural differences between the models result from their differing 
conceptions of amygdala activity. The Frank and Claus (2006) model focuses primarily on the 
top-down biasing effect of orbitofrontal activity on gradual, multi-trial learning in the basal 
ganglia dopamine network, with much less emphasis on the reciprocal influence of relative 
reinforcement probability computations on orbitofrontal activation. We are able to explore in 
depth such effects in ANDREA through feedback of reward prediction error information to the 
amygdala that influences its encoding of emotional arousal, which in turn modulates 
orbitofrontal valuations. These valuations have top-down biasing effects on reinforcement 
learning and action selection similar to those modeled by Frank and Claus (2006), for instance 
how differing orbitofrontal representations of identical reward values caused by framing effects 
produce different activity in dopamine and serotonin prediction error subsystems. 
There are several other issues on which the models differ in important ways. Perhaps the 
most obvious is regarding the role of serotonin acting in opponency with dopamine in reward 
prediction error. Frank and Claus (2006) argue that the low baseline firing rates of dopaminergic 
cells need not mean that firing rate depressions are less capable of encoding highly negative 
outcomes, as there may exist countervailing sensitivity differences in dopamine receptors to 
firing bursts versus dips. While they remain open to a role for serotonin in negative 
reinforcement learning and aversive stimulus processing mediated within OFC, they argue for 
the centrality of dopamine firing dips to negative valuation processing mediated by the basal 
ganglia, even in light of evidence showing these dips are physiologically limited in scope (e.g., 
Bayer & Glimcher, 2005). Our model can be considered structurally consistent with this line of   45 
reasoning, since the mutual biasing effects we have implemented between dopamine and 
serotonin produce the same dopaminergic firing depressions utilized computationally by Frank 
and Claus in cases where we describe encoding via serotonergic activity. Clearly, though, the 
models differ markedly in the degree to which they assign explanatory import to dopamine firing 
dips versus concomitant serotonergic firing increases. Further differences are evident in 
respective extents of brain region modeling. Frank and Claus employ more complex conceptions 
of orbitofrontal cortex and midbrain dopamine areas than are implemented by ANDREA, 
differentially utilizing specific subpopulations of these broadly defined brain areas. In contrast, 
ANDREA includes limited but important contributions from anterior cingulate and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortices. These include involvement in encoding the behavioral relevance of 
outcomes, how this encoding may differ for positive and negative outcomes, and the subsequent 
effects of behavioral saliency on emotional arousal. These are brain regions omitted in the model 
of Frank and Claus (2006) that they acknowledge may be crucial to understanding decision 
phenomena. Finally, ANDREA is the first model to explore a possible role for neural saturation 
in explaining the nature of subjective valuation. This effect is not examined in the Frank and 
Claus work, which does not address the leveling off of the prospect theory value function for 
increasingly extreme losses and gains. Thus, while these two models are fairly consistent with 
one another and share similarities in their large-scale approaches to modeling the neural 
foundations of decision making, they both make unique contributions to explaining different 
aspects of relevant behaviors and psychological processes. 
One of the most fertile areas for future applications of neural affective decision theory 
and the ANDREA model is the burgeoning field of neuroeconomics, which operates at the 
intersection of economics, psychology, and neuroscience (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec,   46 
2005; Glimcher & Rustichini, 2004; Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure, & Cohen, 2006). Examples 
of such applications include the previously mentioned findings regarding preference reversal in 
joint versus separate option evaluation (Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999) and 
observed interactions between risk, uncertainty and emotion (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001), both 
of which seem explainable via the neurological mechanisms we have modeled. Unlike traditional 
economic theory, we do not take preferences as given, but rather explain them as the result of 
specific neural operations. A person’s preference for A over B is the result of a neural-affective 
evaluation in which the representation of A produces a more positive anticipated reward value (or 
at least a less negative value) than the representation of B. As depicted in Figure 12, the neural-
affective evaluation of options depends on their cognitive-emotional representation, which can 
vary depending on the presentation and context of information. This dependence explains why 
actual human preferences often do not obey the axioms of traditional microeconomic theory. In 
addition to neuroeconomics, we are exploring the relevance of our theory and model to 
understanding ethical judgments, the neural bases of which are under increasing investigation 
(Casebeer and Churchland, 2003; Greene and Haidt, 2002; Moll et al., 2005). Finally, while 
neural affective decision theory is primarily intended as a descriptive account of how people 
actually do make decisions, but it can provide a starting point for developing a prescriptive 
theory of how they ought to make better decisions (Thagard, 2006). 
Like all models, ANDREA provides a drastically simplified picture of the phenomena it 
simulates, and there are many possible areas for improvement and extension. These include 
increasing the complexity of individual populations, adding more brain areas, modeling more 
relationships between brain areas, and exploring the effects of neuronal firing saturation beyond 
simply orbitofrontal cortex. Nevertheless, we have described a variety of neurobiologically   47 
realistic mechanisms for fundamental decision processes, and shown their applicability to 
explaining several major experimental findings in behavioral decision research. Besides 
implementing original mechanistic ideas, such as a role for saturation in explaining diminishing 
marginal sensitivity in prospect theory, ANDREA contributes to two important classes of 
explanation in decision neuroscience: 1) Generalization and novel syntheses of hitherto unrelated 
mechanisms of neural processing (e.g., multiplicative models of attention and reward 
reinforcement learning); and 2) Specific and detailed grounding of behaviorally explored 
psychological phenomena in such plausible and realistic neurocomputational mechanisms. The 
result, we hope, is a deeper understanding of how and why people make the choices that they do. 
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APPENDIX A: NEUROCOMPUTATIONAL DETAILS 
Our reward model was implemented in MATLAB 7.0.1 on a PC with an Intel Pentium 4 
processor running at 2.53 GHz, with 1.00 GB of RAM available. For simulations of the extent 
that we have conducted and described here, these specifications represent close to the minimum 
required, based on the memory and other resource requirements of the most recent version of the 
NESim NEF simulation software running within MATLAB. NESim documentation and software 
download links are available online at http://compneuro.uwaterloo.ca. 
We modeled spiking activity for a total of 7600 neurons spread over 7 specific 
populations (Fig. 1), using the common and physiologically realistic leaky integrate-and-fire   48 
(LIF) model for each of our modeled neurons (see Appendix B). In particular, we use 800-1200 
neurons for simulating each of the amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, ventral striatum, anterior 
cingulate cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, representing one- to three-dimensional 
vectors as needed in the neural engineering framework (Appendix B). The areas representing 
midbrain dopaminergic neurons and the dorsal raphe nucleus of the brainstem are each modeled 
with 1200-neuron ensembles, each with several discrete subpopulations, in order to capture the 
additional complexities involved in the encodings and transformations we assign to these areas in 
our model (recurrent, rectified, biased-opponent calculation of reward prediction error; see 
Appendix C). 
Each individual neuron is based on a reduced-complexity biophysical model that 
includes features fundamental to most neurons, including conventional action potentials (spikes), 
spike train variability, absolute refractoriness, background firing, and membrane leak currents. 
The membrane time constant for our LIF neurons is set to 10 ms, with a refractory period (a 
post-spike delay during which the neuron may not fire) of 1 ms. We introduce at simulation 
runtime 10% Gaussian, independent zero-mean noise, relative to normalized maximum firing 
rates, to simulate the noisy environment in which our neurons operate. These choices are based 
on plausible biological assumptions (see Eliasmith & Anderson, 2003), and we have made 
reasonable efforts to select neurobiologically realistic values for other network cell parameters as 
well. For example, our 5 ms synaptic time constant for dorsal raphe serotonergic neurons is 
consistent with the 3 ms decay constants observed in vivo (Li & Bayliss, 1998). Neurons in the 
cortical areas we have modeled have been shown to have maximum firing rates ranging from 20-
40 Hz in dorsolateral prefrontal and orbitofrontal areas (Wallis & Miller, 2003) to at least 50 Hz 
in anterior cingulate cortex (Davis et al., 2000). Thus, our selection of a 10-80 Hz saturation   49 
range for neurons in these model ensembles is a physiologically reasonable compromise to 
maintain population sizes that are manageable for simulation purposes. Ensembles must grow 
increasingly large to allow for meaningful representation with slower-firing, smaller saturation-
range neurons making up the ensembles. 
Practical considerations nonetheless made necessary some limitations on biological 
realism. Principally, the saturation ranges we selected for our modeled subcortical regions are 
appreciably higher (by roughly a factor of 10) than those observed empirically for typical 
neurons in these areas. The much larger neural ensemble sizes that would be required for clean 
representation and transformation using the extremely low experimentally observed firing rates 
would have made our large-scale simulations computationally impracticable given available 
resources. We additionally support this compromise of biological realism by noting that 
significantly higher firing peaks (greater than 100 Hz) are observed in the bursting behavior of 
both certain raphe serotonergic neurons (e.g., Gartside et al., 2000; Hajós et al., 1995) and 
subpopulations of the amygdala (Driesang & Pape, 2000; Paré & Gaudreau, 1996), and to less 
degree in midbrain and striatum dopaminergic neurons as well (Hyland et al., 2002). The specific 
activity our model produces in these subcortical areas seems well-suited to coding via bursting 
neurons (large but transient firing upsurges that interpose lengthier periods of near-zero activity). 
While we do not define here an explicit alternative neuron model to LIF, Eliasmith (2005a) 
describes how bursting could be incorporated into the NEF, and thus NESim simulations. 
For the most part, we have chosen neuron firing thresholds (that is, the respective input 
levels above which individual neurons begin to respond) from an even distribution over a range 
represented symmetrically around zero, with neuron preferred directions in the space of 
representation also chosen from an even distribution (i.e., equal numbers of ‘on’ and ‘off’   50 
neurons; see Appendix B). The exceptions to this rule are single subpopulations of both the 
dorsal raphe and midbrain dopaminergic regions. In these cases, our establishment of minimum 
firing thresholds of zero combines with an exclusive use of positively sloped ‘on’ neurons in 
these subpopulations to produce insensitivity to negative values (i.e., rectified reward prediction 
error encoding). This corresponds well with experimentally observed physiological limitations in 
the computation of reward prediction error in these brain regions (see Bayer & Glimcher, 2005, 
as well as the discussion of dopamine and serotonin within the main text description of the 
ANDREA model). 
APPENDIX B: NEF REPRESENTATION, TRANSFORMATION AND DYNAMICS 
The NEF consists primarily of three fundamental principles regarding the representation 
of information in neural populations, the means by which these representations are transformed 
through interactions between populations, and the control theoretic nature of the characterization 
of neural dynamics. Eliasmith and Anderson (2003) present a rigorous explication and analysis 
of the NEF, but the mathematical details we outline here should be sufficient for understanding 
the fundamental nature and operation of our neural model of affective choice and valuation. 
Consider a neural ensemble whose activities ai(x) encode some vector quantity x(t) 
mapping onto a real-world quantity (eye position, emotional arousal, etc.). Note that this quantity 
need not be a vector; scalars, functions, and function spaces can be represented and manipulated 
in the NEF in a near-identical fashion. The encoding of x involves a conversion of x(t) into a 
neural spike train: 
      [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ( )) i in i i
n
a t t G J t δ = − =  x x ,        [B1] 
where  [ ] i G ⋅  is the nonlinear function describing the specific nature of the spiking response,  i J  is 
the current in the cell body (soma) of a particular neuron and i and n are relevant indices (i   51 
indexing specific neurons, n indexing the individual spikes produced by a given neuron). The 
nonlinearity G we employ is the common leaky-integrate-and-fire (LIF) model:  
      ( ) ( ) ,
RC
i i i i dV dt V J R τ = − − x         [B2] 
where  i V  represents somatic voltage, R  the leak resistance, and 
RC
i τ  the RC (membrane) time 
constant. The system is integrated until the membrane potential  i V  crosses the threshold  th V , at 
which point a spike  ( ) in t t δ −  is generated and  i V  is reset to zero for the duration of the refractory 
period, 
ref
i τ  (Eliasmith & Anderson, 2003). A basic description of the soma current is 
      ( )
bias
i i i i i J J α φ η = ⋅ + + x x   ,         [B3] 
where  ( ) i J x  is the current input to neuron i, xis (in this case) the vector variable of the stimulus 
space encoded by the neuron,  i α  is a gain factor,  i φ   is the preferred direction vector of the 
neuron in the stimulus space, 
bias
i J  is a bias current (accounting for any background activity) and 
i η  models any noise to which the system is subject. Note in particular that the dot product 
i φ ⋅x   describes how a potentially complex (i.e., high-dimensional) physical quantity, such as 
an encoded stimulus, is related to a scalar signal describing the input current. For scalars, the 
encoding vector is either +1 (an ‘on’ neuron) or -1 (an ‘off’ neuron). [B1] thus captures the 
nonlinear encoding process from a high-dimensional variable, x, to a one dimensional soma 
current,  i J , to a train of neural spikes,  ( ) in t t δ − . 
Under this encoding paradigm, the original stimulus vector representation can be 
estimated by decoding those activities; that is, converting neural spike trains back into quantities 
relevant for explanations of neural computation at the level of our chosen representations. A 
plausible means of characterizing this decoding is as a specific linear transformation of the spike   52 
train. In the NEF, the original stimulus vector  ( ) t x  is decoded by computing an estimate  ˆ( ) t x  
using a linear combination of filters  ( ) i h t  that are weighted by certain decoding weights i φ : 
      ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) in i i i in i
in in
t t t h t h t t δ φ φ = − ∗ = −   x ,    [B4] 
where the decoding weights are calculated by a mean-squared error minimization (Eliasmith & 
Anderson, 2003) and the operation ‘∗’ indicates convolution. The  ( ) i h t  filters are linear 
temporal decoders, which are taken to be the postsynaptic currents (PSCs) in the associated 
neuron i for reasons of biological plausibility. Together, the nonlinear encoding in [B1] and the 
linear decoding in [B4] define an ensemble ‘code’ for the neural representation of x. 
The next aspect of the NEF to examine is the means by which computations are 
performed in order to transform the representations present in a given model. The main task 
needed to be performed is the calculation of connection weights between the different 
populations involved in a transformation. As an example, let us consider the transformation 
z = x⋅ y. The process of connection weight calculation can be characterized as substituting into 
our encoding equation [B1] the decodings of x and y (as per [B4]) in order to find the encoding 
of z, which represents our transformation of interest: 
  
,
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ,
k k
bias
k k k k
x y bias
k k k i i j j k
i j
bias
k kij i j k
i j
c z c x y
G x y J
G a x b y J
G a x b y J
α φ
α φ φ φ
ω
= ⋅
  = ⋅ +  
   
= ⋅ +    
     
 
= +  
 
 


  
where 
x y
kij k k i j ω α φ φ φ =   represents the connection weights between neurons i, j and k in the x, y, 
and z populations, respectively. It should be noted that the nonlinear neural activity interaction   53 
suggested in this example is avoided in our actual model—all interactions are implemented in a 
purely linear fashion, as is typically taken to be the case in real neural systems (see Eliasmith & 
Anderson, 2003, for complete implementation details). 
Finally, dynamics play a fundamental role in the overall operation of our model, such as 
in our recurrent reward prediction error computation. We can describe the dynamics of a neural 
population in control theoretic form via the dynamics state equation that is at the basis of modern 
control theory: 
      ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t = + x Ax Bu  ,            [B5] 
where A is the dynamics matrix, B is the input matrix, u(t) is the input or control vector, and x(t) 
is the state vector. At this high-level of characterization we are detached from any neural-level 
implementation details. It is possible, however, to introduce simple modifications that render the 
system neurally plausible. The first step in converting this characterization is to account for 
intrinsic neural dynamics. To do so, we assume a standard PSC model given by ( )
1 / t h t e
τ τ
− − = , 
and then employ the following derived relation (Eliasmith & Anderson, 2003): 
     
τ
τ
′ = +
′ =
A A I
B B
              [B6] 
so that our neurally plausible high-level dynamics characterization becomes 
      [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . t h t t t ′ ′ = ∗ + x A x B u          [B7] 
To integrate this dynamics description with the neural representation code we described 
previously, we combine the dynamics of [B7], the encoding of [B1], and the population decoding 
of x and u as per [B4]. That is, we take decodings  ˆ ( ) j jn j jnh t t φ = − 
x x  and ˆ ( ) k kn k knh t t φ = − 
u u  
and introduce neural dynamics into the encoding operation as follows:   54 
[ ]
( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ' ( ) ' ( )
' ( ) ' ( )
( ) ( ) .
bias
in i i i i
n
bias
i i i i
bias
i i i j jn j k kn k i jn kn
bias
i ij j jn ik k kn i jn kn
t t G t J
G t t J
G h t t h t t J
G h t t h t t J
δ α φ
α φ
α φ φ φ
ω ω
  − = +  
  = + +  
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
 
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x u
x
A x B u
A B



  [B8] 
It is interesting to note that  ( ) h t  in the above characterization defines both the neural dynamics 
and the decoding of the relevant representations.  ' ij i i j  α φ φ =
x A   and  ' ik i i k  α φ φ =
u B   
describe the recurrent and input connection weights, respectively, which implement the 
dynamics defined by the control theoretic structure from [B7] in a neurally plausible network.   55 
APPENDIX C: REPRESENTATION/TRANSFORMATION SUMMARY 
Table C1 encapsulates the complete inputs, outputs and transformations we use to model 
specific interactions between the brain regions included in our model (see also Figure 1 and 
discussions of equations in the main body for more high-level, conceptual characterizations of 
connectivity and signal transformation). Variable names are as in the text of the Methods section.  
Brain area  Inputs  Outputs 
AMYG  A0(t) (ext.) 
A1(t)  
DA(t) 
5-HT(t) 
C(t) 
 
A(t) = A1(t) + β ·DA(t) + γ ·5-HT(t) + C(t), 
 
where A1(t) = A0(t) + λ ·(1 – P[outcome X]) 
OFC  V(t) (ext.) 
A(t) 
 
S(t) = A(t) ·V(t) 
5-HT  S(t) 
E
+(t) 
P(t – 1) 
E
-(t) = P(t – 1) – S(t) 
5-HT(t) =  E
-(t) – (1 – )E
+(t) 
P(t) = P(t – 1) + α E(t) 
 
DA  S(t) 
E
-(t) 
P(t – 1) 
E
+(t) = S(t) – P(t – 1) 
DA(t) =  E
+(t) – (1 – )E
-(t) 
P(t) = P(t – 1) + α E(t) 
 
VS  DA(t) 
5-HT(t) 
 
E(t) = DA(t) – 5-HT(t) 
ACC  S(t) 
E(t) 
C(t) 
 
B(t) = 2·(S(t)  0) – 1 
R(t) = B(t) / [η + E(t)] 
C(t) 
DLPFC  R(t) 
5-HT(t) 
 
C(t) = µ ·5-HT(t) 
 
Table C1: Transformation summary. A0 and V are provided as external inputs to the model. Note 
the recurrent connectivity and opponent interaction between 5-HT and DA. Abbreviations: 
AMYG, amygdala; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; 5-HT, raphe dorsalis serotonergic neurons; DA, 
midbrain dopaminergic neurons; VS, ventral striatum; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; DLPFC, 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 
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These equations describe explicitly the nature of the connectivity relationships and signal 
transformation processes outlined in Figure 1 and discussed in the main body description of the 
ANDREA model. 
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